Satellite user terminals are a promising target for adversaries seeking to target satellite communication networks. Despite this, many protections commonly found in terrestrial routers are not present in some user terminals. As a case study we audit the attack surface presented by the Starlink router's admin interface, using fuzzing to uncover a denial of service attack on the Starlink user terminal. We explore the attack's impact, particularly in the cases of drive-by attackers, and attackers that are able to maintain a continuous presence on the network. Finally, we discuss wider implications, looking at lessons learned in terrestrial router security, and how to properly implement them in this new context.
翻译:卫星用户终端对试图瞄准卫星通信网络的对手来说是一个很有希望的目标。 尽管如此,在一些用户终端中,地面路由器中通常发现的许多保护都不存在。作为案例研究,我们审计了Starlink路由器行政界面提出的攻击表面,利用模糊手段发现Starlink用户终端拒绝提供服务攻击的情况。我们探讨了这次攻击的影响,特别是在司机袭击者和能够维持网络持续存在的攻击者的情况下。最后,我们讨论了更广泛的影响,研究了在地面路由器安全方面的经验教训,以及如何在这一新背景下适当实施这些经验教训。</s>