Various studies among side-channel attacks have tried to extract information through leakages from electronic devices to reach the instruction flow of some appliances. However, previous methods highly depend on the resolution of traced data. Obtaining low-noise traces is not always feasible in real attack scenarios. This study proposes two deep models to extract low and high-level features from side-channel traces and classify them to related instructions. We aim to evaluate the accuracy of a side-channel attack on low-resolution data with a more robust feature extractor thanks to neural networks. As inves-tigated, instruction flow in real programs is predictable and follows specific distributions. This leads to proposing a LSTM model to estimate these distributions, which could expedite the reverse engineering process and also raise the accuracy. The proposed model for leakage classification reaches 54.58% accuracy on average and outperforms other existing methods on our datasets. Also, LSTM model reaches 94.39% accuracy for instruction prediction on standard implementation of cryptographic algorithms.
翻译:侧道攻击中的各种研究试图通过电子装置泄漏获得信息,以达到某些电器的指令流。然而,以往的方法高度取决于追踪数据的分辨率。在实际攻击情况下,获取低噪音痕迹并不总是可行的。本研究提出两个深层模型,从侧道的痕迹中提取低和高层次特征,并将其分类为相关指示。我们的目的是评估借助神经网络对低分辨率数据进行侧道攻击的准确性,并使用较强的特征提取器。如插插图一样,真实程序中的指令流是可预测的,并遵循具体的分布。这导致提出一个LSTM模型来估计这些分布,这可以加快反向工程进程并提高准确性。拟议的渗漏分类模型平均达到54.58%的精确度,超出我们数据集上其他现有方法的精确度。此外,LSTM模型还达到94.39%的精确度,用于对加密算法的标准执行进行指示预测。