Greedy Transaction Fee Mechanisms for (Non-)myopic Miners

Decentralized cryptocurrencies are payment systems that rely on aligning the incentives of users and miners to operate correctly and offer a high quality of service to users. Recent literature studies the mechanism design problem of the auction serving as a cryptocurrency's transaction fee mechanism (TFM). We present a general framework that captures both myopic and non-myopic settings, as well as different possible strategic models for users. Within this general framework, when restricted to the myopic case, we show that while the mechanism that requires a user to "pay-as-bid", and greedily chooses among available transactions based on their fees, is not dominant strategy incentive-compatible for users, it has a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium where bids are slightly shaded. Relaxing this incentive compatibility requirement circumvents the impossibility results proven by previous works, and allows for an approximately revenue and welfare optimal, myopic miner incentive-compatible (MMIC), and off-chain-agreement (OCA)-proof mechanism. We prove these guarantees using different benchmarks, and show that the pay-as-bid greedy auction is the revenue optimal Bayesian incentive-compatible, MMIC and 1-OCA-proof mechanism among a large class of mechanisms. We move beyond the myopic setting explored in the literature, to one where users offer transaction fees for their transaction to be accepted, as well as report their urgency level by specifying the time to live of the transaction, after which it expires. We analyze pay-as-bid mechanisms in this setting, and show the competitive ratio guarantees provided by the greedy allocation rule. We then present a better-performing non-myopic rule, and analyze its competitive ratio. The above analysis is stated in terms of a cryptocurrency TFM, but applies to other settings, such as cloud computing and decentralized "gig" economy, as well.