A principal hires an agent to work on a long-term project that culminates in a breakthrough or a breakdown. At each time, the agent privately chooses to work or shirk. Working increases the arrival rate of breakthroughs and decreases the arrival rate of breakdowns. To motivate the agent to work, the principal conducts costly inspections. She fires the agent if shirking is detected. We characterize the principal's optimal inspection policy. Periodic inspections are optimal if work primarily speeds up breakthroughs. Random inspections are optimal if work primarily delays breakdowns. Crucially, the agent's actions determine his risk-attitude over the timing of punishments.
翻译:检查时间应该可预测吗?
翻译后的摘要:
一个委托人雇用一个代理在一个长期项目中工作,项目的结果可能是一个突破或者一个崩溃。每个时刻,代理人会选择私下工作或者逃避。工作会增加突破的到来速率,并降低崩溃的到来速率。为了激励代理人工作,委托人会进行可靠的检查。如果检测出逃避行为,委托人会解雇代理人。我们对委托人的最优检查策略进行了描述。如果工作主要加速突破,则周期性检查最优。如果工作主要延迟崩溃,则随机检查最优。至关重要的是,代理人的行为决定了他对惩罚时间的风险态度。