博弈论(Game theory)有时也称为对策论,或者赛局理论,应用数学的一个分支,目前在生物学、经济学、国际关系、计算机科学、政治学、军事战略和其他很多学科都有广泛的应用。主要研究公式化了的激励结构(游戏或者博弈)间的相互作用。是研究具有斗争或竞争性质现象的数学理论和方法。也是运筹学的一个重要学科。

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博弈论对于非专业的定量课程来说是一个很好的话题,因为它发展了数学模型来理解人类在社会、政治和经济环境中的行为。

本文通过丰富的流行文化背景来探讨博弈论的思想。在每一章的末尾,有一节是关于这些概念在流行文化中的应用。它建议以博弈论为主题的电影、电视节目和小说。每个部分的问题都是作为写作作业的论文提示。课程目标。

向学生介绍博弈论的数学知识。 教学生如何使用数学模型来解决社会和经济情况下的问题。 建立学生的定量直觉。 向学生介绍数学构建人类行为的力量。 为学生提供使用代数技术的机会,如线性模型和方程组,在博弈论的应用。 让学生有机会在博弈论中使用概率的基本概念,如期望值

https://nordstromjf.github.io/

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An objective of network neutrality is that the design of regulations for the Internet will ensure that it remains a public, open platform where innovations can thrive. While there is broad agreement that preserving the content quality of service falls under the purview of net neutrality, the role of differential pricing, especially the practice of \emph {zero-rating} remains controversial. Even though some countries (India, Canada) have banned zero-rating, others have either taken no stance or explicitly allowed it (South Africa, Kenya, U.S.). In this paper, we model zero-rating options available between Internet service providers (ISPs) and content providers (CPs) and use these models to better understand the conditions under which offering zero-rated services are preferred, and who specifically gains in utility. We develop a formulation in which providers' incomes vary, from low-income startups to high-income incumbents, and where their decisions to zero-rate are a variation of the traditional prisoner's dilemma game. We find that if zero-rating is permitted, low-income CPs often lose utility, whereas high-income CPs often gain utility. We also study the competitiveness of the CP markets via the \emph{Herfindahl Index}. Our findings suggest that in most cases the introduction of zero-rating \emph{reduces} competitiveness.

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An objective of network neutrality is that the design of regulations for the Internet will ensure that it remains a public, open platform where innovations can thrive. While there is broad agreement that preserving the content quality of service falls under the purview of net neutrality, the role of differential pricing, especially the practice of \emph {zero-rating} remains controversial. Even though some countries (India, Canada) have banned zero-rating, others have either taken no stance or explicitly allowed it (South Africa, Kenya, U.S.). In this paper, we model zero-rating options available between Internet service providers (ISPs) and content providers (CPs) and use these models to better understand the conditions under which offering zero-rated services are preferred, and who specifically gains in utility. We develop a formulation in which providers' incomes vary, from low-income startups to high-income incumbents, and where their decisions to zero-rate are a variation of the traditional prisoner's dilemma game. We find that if zero-rating is permitted, low-income CPs often lose utility, whereas high-income CPs often gain utility. We also study the competitiveness of the CP markets via the \emph{Herfindahl Index}. Our findings suggest that in most cases the introduction of zero-rating \emph{reduces} competitiveness.

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