In this article, we relax the Bayesianity assumption in the now-traditional model of Bayesian Persuasion introduced by Kamenica \& Gentzkow. Unlike preexisting approaches -- which have tackled the possibility of the receiver (Bob) being non-Bayesian by considering that his thought process is not Bayesian yet known to the sender (Alice), possibly up to a parameter -- we let Alice merely assume that Bob behaves `almost like' a Bayesian agent, in some sense, without resorting to any specific model. Under this assumption, we study Alice's strategy when both utilities are quadratic and the prior is isotropic. We show that, contrary to the Bayesian case, Alice's optimal response may not be linear anymore. This fact is unfortunate as linear policies remain the only ones for which the induced belief distribution is known. What is more, evaluating linear policies proves difficult except in particular cases, let alone finding an optimal one. Nonetheless, we derive bounds that prove linear policies are near-optimal and allow Alice to compute a near-optimal linear policy numerically. With this solution in hand, we show that Alice shares less information with Bob as he departs more from Bayesianity, much to his detriment.
翻译:在本篇文章中,我们放松了卡梅尼卡·金茨科夫(Kamenica à Gentzkow)在目前传统的巴伊西亚预测模型中采用的巴伊西亚假设。与以前的做法不同,我们以前的做法解决了接受者(Bob)成为非巴伊西亚人的可能性,因为考虑到他的思维过程不是巴伊西亚人所知道的(爱丽丝),甚至可能是一个参数,我们让爱丽丝只是假设鲍勃的行为“最像”巴伊西亚代理人,在某种意义上不诉诸任何特定模式。根据这一假设,我们研究爱丽丝的战略,当两者都是二次二次不同,我们发现与巴伊西亚案例相反,爱丽丝的最佳反应可能不再是线性。这个事实很不幸,因为线性政策仍然是人们所知道的唯一政策。更糟糕的是,评价线性政策证明很困难,但特定情况除外,更不用说找到一个最佳模式。然而,我们从证明线性政策的界限是近乎理想的,允许爱丽丝对近视线性线性政策进行比较,而前一次是零度的。我们表明,爱丽丝的最佳反应可能不再是线性线性政策。这个解决方案,我们从鲍尔斯的比他更低的版本。