Prompt learning has been proven to be highly effective in improving pre-trained language model (PLM) adaptability, surpassing conventional fine-tuning paradigms, and showing exceptional promise in an ever-growing landscape of applications and APIs tailored for few-shot learning scenarios. Despite the growing prominence of prompt learning-based APIs, their security concerns remain underexplored. In this paper, we undertake a pioneering study on the Trojan susceptibility of prompt-learning PLM APIs. We identified several key challenges, including discrete-prompt, few-shot, and black-box settings, which limit the applicability of existing backdoor attacks. To address these challenges, we propose TrojPrompt, an automatic and black-box framework to effectively generate universal and stealthy triggers and insert Trojans into hard prompts. Specifically, we propose a universal API-driven trigger discovery algorithm for generating universal triggers for various inputs by querying victim PLM APIs using few-shot data samples. Furthermore, we introduce a novel progressive trojan poisoning algorithm designed to generate poisoned prompts that retain efficacy and transferability across a diverse range of models. Our experiments and results demonstrate TrojPrompt's capacity to effectively insert Trojans into text prompts in real-world black-box PLM APIs, while maintaining exceptional performance on clean test sets and significantly outperforming baseline models. Our work sheds light on the potential security risks in current models and offers a potential defensive approach.
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