Diffie-Hellman key-agreement and RSA cryptosystem are widely used to provide security in internet protocols. But both of the two algorithms are totally breakable using Shor's algorithms. This paper proposes two connected matrix-based key-agreements: (a) Diffie-Hellman Key-Agreement with Errors and (b) RSA-Resemble Key-agreement, which, respectively, bear resemblance to Diffie-Hellman key-agreement and RSA cryptosystem and thereby they gain some of the well-known security characteristics of these two algorithms, but without being subject to Shor's algorithms attacks. That is, the new schemes avoid the direct reliance on the hardness of Discrete Logarithm and Integer Factoring problems which are solvable by Shor's algorithms. The paper introduces a new family of quantum-safe hardness assumptions which consist of taking noisy powers of binary matrices. The new assumptions are derived from Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption in the general linear group GL(n,2) by introducing random noise into a quadruple similar to that which define the DDH assumption in GL(n,2(. Thereby we make certain that the resulting quadruple is secure against Shor's algorithm attack and any other DLP-based attack. Thence, the resulting assumptions, are used as basis for the two key-agreement schemes. We prove that these key-agreements are secure -- in key indistinguishability notion -- under the new assumptions.
翻译:Diffie- Hellman 键协议和 RSA 加密系统被广泛用于提供互联网协议的安全性。 但这两种算法都使用 Shor 的算法完全可以打破。 本文建议了两种连接的基于矩阵的密钥协议:(a) Diffie- Hellman 键协议与错误协议;(b) RSA- Reemble 键协议,它们分别与 Diffie- Hellman 键协议和 RSA 加密系统相似, 因而它们获得了这两个算法中众所周知的安全性特征, 但这两个算法都没有受到 Shor 的算法攻击。 也就是说, 新的算法避免直接依赖 Discrete Logarithm 和 Intger 键协议的硬性。 该文件提出了一套新的量级安全硬性假设, 其中包括使用基于 bingary 基基基的噪音。 新的假设来自 Discal Diffie- Hellman (DDDDH) 在一般直线组中假设 GL (n) 的算算法中, 由此将硬性定义到一个任意的硬度。