We focus on the strategyproofness of voting systems where voters must choose a number of options among several possibilities. These systems include those that are used for Participatory Budgeting, where we organize an election to determine the allocation of a community's budget (city, region, etc.) dedicated to the financing of projects. We present a model for studying voting mechanisms and the Constrained Change Property (CCP), which will be used to design voting mechanisms that are always strategyproof. We also define a new notion of social choice function and use it to design a new class of utilitarian voting mechanisms that we call score voting. We prove that the mechanisms designed with core voting with a neutral score function are equivalent to knapsack voting on the same instance and that any score voting designed with a total score function is strategyproof if and only if its score function satisfies CCP. These results are combined to devise an algorithm that can find the closest total score function that makes any given score voting to be strategyproof.
翻译:我们注重投票系统的战略安全性,选民必须在其中选择几种可能性中的若干选项。这些系统包括用于参与性预算编制的系统,我们组织选举,以确定社区预算(城市、地区等)专门用于项目融资的分配情况。我们提出了一个模式,用于研究投票机制和受控变更属性(CCP),用于设计总是有战略防守的投票机制。我们还定义了社会选择功能的新概念,并用它来设计一种我们称之为得分的新的实用性投票机制类别。我们证明,以中性分数功能的核心投票机制相当于在同一情况下的Knapack投票,任何带有总分函数的得分投票,只有在得分功能符合CCP的情况下,才能防战略。这些结果合在一起形成了一种算法,可以找到最接近的总得分功能,使任何得分的得分表决都具有战略防患。