Machine Learning (ML) has become ubiquitous, and its deployment in Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS) is inevitable due to its automated nature and high accuracy compared to traditional models in processing and classifying large volumes of data. However, ML has been found to have several flaws, most importantly, adversarial attacks, which aim to trick ML models into producing faulty predictions. While most adversarial attack research focuses on computer vision datasets, recent studies have explored the suitability of these attacks against ML-based network security entities, especially NIDS, due to the wide difference between different domains regarding the generation of adversarial attacks. To further explore the practicality of adversarial attacks against ML-based NIDS in-depth, this paper presents three distinct contributions: identifying numerous practicality issues for evasion adversarial attacks on ML-NIDS using an attack tree threat model, introducing a taxonomy of practicality issues associated with adversarial attacks against ML-based NIDS, and investigating how the dynamicity of some real-world ML models affects adversarial attacks against NIDS. Our experiments indicate that continuous re-training, even without adversarial training, can reduce the effectiveness of adversarial attacks. While adversarial attacks can compromise ML-based NIDSs, our aim is to highlight the significant gap between research and real-world practicality in this domain, warranting attention.
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