Backdoor attacks are dangerous and difficult to prevent in federated learning (FL), where training data is sourced from untrusted clients over long periods of time. These difficulties arise because: (a) defenders in FL do not have access to raw training data, and (b) a new phenomenon we identify called backdoor leakage causes models trained continuously to eventually suffer from backdoors due to cumulative errors in defense mechanisms. We propose shadow learning, a framework for defending against backdoor attacks in the FL setting under long-range training. Shadow learning trains two models in parallel: a backbone model and a shadow model. The backbone is trained without any defense mechanism to obtain good performance on the main task. The shadow model combines filtering of malicious clients with early-stopping to control the attack success rate even as the data distribution changes. We theoretically motivate our design and show experimentally that our framework significantly improves upon existing defenses against backdoor attacks.
翻译:在联合学习(FL)中,培训数据来源于长期不信任的客户,因此,后门攻击是危险和难以防止的,原因是:(a) FL的维护者无法获得原始培训数据,以及(b) 我们确认的新现象导致一种新现象,即所谓的后门渗漏导致由于防御机制的累积错误而不断受训以最终受后门攻击的模式。我们提议进行影子学习,这是在远程培训下在FL环境中防御后门攻击的框架。影子学习同时训练两种模式:一个主干模型和一个影子模型。骨干在没有任何防御机制的情况下接受培训,以取得主要任务的良好业绩。影子模型将恶意客户的过滤与早期阻止控制攻击成功率结合起来,即使随着数据分配的变化,我们也在理论上鼓励我们的设计,并实验性地表明我们的框架大大改进了现有的对后门攻击的防御。