Virtual reality (VR) devices use a variety of sensors to capture a rich body of user-generated data, which can be misused by malicious parties to covertly infer information about the user. Privacy-enhancing techniques seek to reduce the amount of personally identifying information in sensor data, but these techniques are typically developed for a subset of data streams that are available on the platform, without consideration for the auxiliary information that may be readily available from other sensors. In this paper, we evaluate whether body motion data can be used to circumvent the privacy protections applied to eye tracking data to enable user identification on a VR platform, and vice versa. We empirically show that eye tracking, headset tracking, and hand tracking data are not only informative for inferring user identity on their own, but contain complementary information that can increase the rate of successful user identification. Most importantly, we demonstrate that applying privacy protections to only a subset of the data available in VR can create an opportunity for an adversary to bypass those privacy protections by using other unprotected data streams that are available on the platform, performing a user identification attack as accurately as though a privacy mechanism was never applied. These results highlight a new privacy consideration at the intersection between eye tracking and VR, and emphasizes the need for privacy-enhancing techniques that address multiple technologies comprehensively.
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