Correlated Equilibrium (CE) is a well-established solution concept that captures coordination among agents and enjoys good algorithmic properties. In real-world multi-agent systems, in addition to being in an equilibrium, agents' policies are often expected to meet requirements with respect to safety, and fairness. Such additional requirements can often be expressed in terms of the state density which measures the state-visitation frequencies during the course of a game. However, existing CE notions or CE-finding approaches cannot explicitly specify a CE with particular properties concerning state density; they do so implicitly by either modifying reward functions or using value functions as the selection criteria. The resulting CE may thus not fully fulfil the state-density requirements. In this paper, we propose Density-Based Correlated Equilibria (DBCE), a new notion of CE that explicitly takes state density as selection criterion. Concretely, we instantiate DBCE by specifying different state-density requirements motivated by real-world applications. To compute DBCE, we put forward the Density Based Correlated Policy Iteration algorithm for the underlying control problem. We perform experiments on various games where results demonstrate the advantage of our CE-finding approach over existing methods in scenarios with state-density concerns.
翻译:在现实世界的多试剂系统中,除了平衡之外,代理器的政策通常会满足安全和公平方面的要求。这些额外要求通常可以用在游戏过程中测量国家访问频率的州密度来表示。然而,现有的中央电子设备概念或中央调查方法不能明确规定带有特定特性的州密度的CE;它们通过修改奖励功能或使用价值功能作为选择标准而隐含地这样做。由此产生的CE可能无法完全满足国家密度要求。在本文中,我们提出了基于密度的Corquilibria(DBCE)的新概念,明确将州访问频率作为选择标准。具体地说,我们用现实世界应用所驱动的不同州密度要求即刻起DBCE。为了计算DBCE,我们提出基于密度的Cor相关的政策 Iteration算法作为选择标准。我们用当前C型控制方法展示了我们当前控制竞赛的优势。我们用各种状态实验方法展示了当前C型游戏的优势。