项目名称: 供应商直销渠道选择问题的演化博弈研究
项目编号: No.71501030
项目类型: 青年科学基金项目
立项/批准年度: 2016
项目学科: 管理科学
项目作者: 李婷婷
作者单位: 东北财经大学
项目金额: 15.4万元
中文摘要: 现有的供应商直销渠道选择问题的研究主要讨论垄断供应商的直销渠道选择,主要的研究方法为非合作博弈理论。然而,供应商往往面对其他的竞争者,各个供应商之间的决策相互影响。此外,供应商所面临的市场环境不断发生变化,其竞争对手和下游零售商的策略也不断进行调整。因此,供应商应动态地调整其渠道结构。本项目针对供应商对称和供应商不对称情形分别建立供应商直销渠道选择的演化博弈模型,刻画供应商种群直销渠道选择策略的演化过程,在不同的初始市场条件下给出供应商的演化稳定策略;建立供应商直销渠道选择和零售商自有品牌引入的演化博弈模型,刻画双方策略的演化过程,重点分析供应商直销渠道选择策略和零售商自有品牌引入策略的相互影响。本项目不仅在理论上,揭示不同供应链情形下供应商直销渠道选择策略的演化规律,而且为供应商的直销渠道选择决策和零售商的自有品牌引入决策提供现实的指导。
中文关键词: 供应链管理;直销渠道;演化博弈理论;渠道冲突;自有品牌
英文摘要: The current study on direct channel selection problem of suppliers focuses on the channel selection of a monopolistic supplier and the main research method is non-cooperative game theory. However, a supplier often faces other competitors and the decisions of them interact with each other. Furthermore, the market environment the suppliers facing is changing and the strategies of their competitors and their retailers are constantly been revising. Therefore, the suppliers should dynamically adjust their channel structure. This project establishes evolutionary game model for suppliers’ direct channel selection when the suppliers are symmetric or asymmetric, depicts the evolution process of the suppliers’ channel selection strategy, gives the evolutionary stable strategy of the suppliers under different initial market conditions; establishes evolutionary game model for suppliers’ direct channel selection and retailers’ store-brand introduction, depicts the evolution process of the strategies of the suppliers and the retailers, focuses on the interaction between the suppliers’ direct channel selection strategy and the retailers’ store-brand introduction strategy. This project not only reveals the evolution law of the suppliers’ direct channel selection strategy in different supply chain cases, and provides realistic guidance for the direct channel selection decisions of the suppliers and the store-brand introduction decisions of the retailers.
英文关键词: supply chain management;direct channel;evolutionary game theory;channel conflict;store-brand