In a 2017 paper, later presented at the Web and Internet Economics conference, titled ``Sequential Deliberation for Social Choice", the authors propose a mechanism in which a series of agents, are tasked to negotiate over a set of decisions S. Building on assumptions of Nash Bargaining and assuming the decision space follows the median graph, the authors constructed a robust algorithm which approximates the decision which minimizes the social cost to the entire population. In this paper, we give a brief overview of the background theory which this paper builds upon from foundational work from Nash, and social choice results which hold true in Condorcet mechanisms. Following this analysis, we consider the stability of the results in the paper with different deviations from Nash equilibrium. These deviations could be pessimal, in the context of unequal bargaining power (say in a labor market) or constructive, as in the context of opinion dynamics. Our analysis is observatory, in the context of simulations, and we hope to formalize the results of these simulations to get an understanding of more general properties in spaces beyond our simulation.
翻译:2017年,在网络和互联网经济学会议上,作者们在一份题为“社会选择的顺序审议”的论文中提议了一种机制,在这一机制中,一系列代理人负责就一系列决定S. 依据纳什谈判的假设和假设决策空间以中位图为基础进行谈判。 作者们根据纳什谈判假设和假设决策空间,构建了一个强有力的算法,该算法与尽量减少对全体人口的社会成本的决定相近。在本文中,我们简要概述了本文件基于纳什基础工作的背景理论,以及康多塞特机制中真实的社会选择结果。在进行这一分析之后,我们考虑文件中的结果是否稳定,与纳什均衡不同。这些偏差可能是微不足道的,在不平等的谈判能力(劳动力市场上说)或建设性的情况下,如同在舆论动态方面一样,我们的分析是观察台,在模拟方面,我们希望将这些模拟的结果正规化,以便了解我们模拟之外空间的更一般特性。