Optimal majority rules and quantitative Condorcet properties of setwise Kemeny voting schemes

The important Kemeny problem, which consists of computing median consensus rankings of an election with respect to the Kemeny voting rule, admits important applications in biology and computational social choice and was generalized recently via an interesting setwise approach by Gilbert et. al. Our first results establish optimal quantitative extensions of the Unanimity property and the well-known $3/4$-majority rule of Betzler et al. for the classical Kemeny median problem. Moreover, by elaborating an exhaustive list of quantified axiomatic properties (such as the Condorcet and Smith criteria, the $5/6$-majority rule, etc.) of the $3$-wise Kemeny rule where not only pairwise comparisons but also the discordance between the winners of subsets of three candidates are also taken into account, we come to the conclusion that the $3$-wise Kemeny voting scheme induced by the $3$-wise Kendall-tau distance presents interesting advantages in comparison with the classical Kemeny rule. For example, it satisfies several improved manipulation-proof properties. Since the $3$-wise Kemeny problem is NP-hard, our results also provide some of the first useful space reduction techniques by determining the relative orders of pairs of alternatives. Our works suggest similar interesting properties of higher setwise Kemeny voting schemes which justify and compensate for the more expensive computational cost than the classical Kemeny scheme.