Advanced persistent threats (APT) are stealthy cyber-attacks that are aimed at stealing valuable information from target organizations and tend to extend in time. Blocking all APTs is impossible, security experts caution, hence the importance of research on early detection and damage limitation. Whole-system provenance-tracking and provenance trace mining are considered promising as they can help find causal relationships between activities and flag suspicious event sequences as they occur. We introduce an unsupervised method that exploits OS-independent features reflecting process activity to detect realistic APT-like attacks from provenance traces. Anomalous processes are ranked using both frequent and rare event associations learned from traces. Results are then presented as implications which, since interpretable, help leverage causality in explaining the detected anomalies. When evaluated on Transparent Computing program datasets (DARPA), our method outperformed competing approaches.
翻译:高级持续威胁(APT)是旨在从目标组织窃取宝贵信息并倾向于延长时间的隐性网络攻击(APT)。封锁所有APT是不可能的,安全专家谨慎,因此研究早期发现和损害限制十分重要。整个系统的源头跟踪和源头追踪采矿被认为很有希望,因为它们有助于发现活动之间的因果关系,并在发生时标出可疑事件序列。我们采用了一种不受监督的方法,利用反映过程活动的OS独立特征,以发现现实的APT类似攻击,从源头痕迹中发现。异常过程的排名采用经常和罕见的事件联系,从痕迹中学习。结果随后被作为影响,因为可以解释,有助于利用因果关系来解释所发现的异常现象。在对透明计算机方案数据集(DARPA)进行评估时,我们的方法优于相互竞争的方法。