Trust-Aware Resilient Control and Coordination of Connected and Automated Vehicles

Security is crucial for cyber-physical systems, such as a network of Connected and Automated Vehicles (CAVs) cooperating to navigate through a road network safely. In this paper, we tackle the security of a cooperating network of CAVs in conflict areas by identifying the critical adversarial objectives from the point of view of uncooperative/malicious agents from our preliminary study, which are (i) safety violations resulting in collisions, and (ii) traffic jams. We utilize a trust framework (and our work doesn't depend on the specific choice of trust/reputation framework) to propose a resilient control and coordination framework that mitigates the effects of such agents and guarantees safe coordination. A class of attacks that can be used to achieve the adversarial objectives is Sybil attacks, which we use to validate our proposed framework through simulation studies. Besides that, we propose an attack detection and mitigation scheme using the trust framework. The simulation results demonstrate that our proposed scheme can detect fake CAVs during a Sybil attack, guarantee safe coordination, and mitigate their effects.