We identify quantitative characteristics of responses to cyber compromises that can be learned from repeatable, systematic experiments. We model a vehicle equipped with an autonomous cyber-defense system and which also has some inherent physical resilience features. When attacked by malware, this ensemble of cyber-physical features (i.e., "bonware") strives to resist and recover from the performance degradation caused by the malware's attack. We propose parsimonious continuous models, and develop stochastic models to aid in quantifying systems' resilience to cyber attacks.
翻译:我们从可重复的系统性实验中可以找到应对网络妥协的量化特点。我们模拟了一辆装备有自主的网络防御系统的飞行器,该飞行器也具有一些固有的体能抗御功能。当被恶意软件攻击时,这种网络物理特征(即“软件 ” ) 的组合(即“软件 ” ) 努力抵制恶意软件攻击造成的性能退化,并从中恢复过来。我们提出了令人厌恶的连续模型,并开发了随机模型,以帮助量化系统对网络袭击的抗御能力。