Universal Coding for Shannon Ciphers under Side-Channel Attacks

We study the universal coding under side-channel attacks posed and investigated by Santoso and Oohama (2019). They proposed a theoretical security model for Shannon cipher system under side-channel attacks, where the adversary is not only allowed to collect ciphertexts by eavesdropping the public communication channel, but is also allowed to collect the physical information leaked by the devices where the cipher system is implemented on such as running time, power consumption, electromagnetic radiation, etc. For any distributions of the plain text, any noisy channels through which the adversary observe the corrupted version of the key, and any measurement device used for collecting the physical information, we can derive an achievable rate region for reliability and security such that if we compress the ciphertext using an affine encoder with rate within the achievable rate region, then: (1) anyone with secret key will be able to decrypt and decode the ciphertext correctly, but (2) any adversary who obtains the ciphertext and also the side physical information will not be able to obtain any information about the hidden source as long as the leaked physical information is encoded with a rate within the rate region.