In this paper, we consider a multi-modal mobility system of travelers each with an individual travel budget, and propose a game-theoretic framework to assign each traveler to a ``mobility service" (each one representing a different mode of transportation). We are interested in equity and sustainability, thus we maximize the worst-case revenue of the mobility system while ensuring ``mobility equity," which we define it in terms of accessibility. In the proposed framework, we ensure that all travelers are truthful and voluntarily participate under informational asymmetry, and the solution respects the individual budget of each traveler. Each traveler may seek to travel using multiple services (e.g., car, bus, train, bike). The services are capacitated and can serve up to a fixed number of travelers at any instant of time. Thus, our problem falls under the category of many-to-one assignment problems, where the goal is to find the conditions that guarantee the stability of assignments. We formulate a linear program of maximizing worst-case revenue under the constraints of mobility equity, and we fully characterize the optimal solution. Finally, we conclude our work by providing a numerical example to illustrate the proposed framework.
翻译:在本文中,我们考虑每个旅行者都有个人旅行预算的多模式流动系统,并提议一个游戏理论框架,指派每个旅行者参加“流动服务”(每个旅行者都代表不同的交通方式)。我们关心的是公平和可持续性,因此我们最大限度地增加流动系统最坏情况的收入,同时确保“流动公平”,我们从无障碍角度界定了“流动公平”。在拟议框架中,我们确保所有旅行者都是诚实的,自愿地参与信息不对称,解决方案尊重每个旅行者的个人预算。每个旅行者都可能寻求使用多种服务(例如汽车、公共汽车、火车、自行车)进行旅行。服务已经具备能力,可以在任何时刻为固定数量的旅行者提供服务。因此,我们的问题属于多任务分配问题类别,目的是找到保证任务稳定的条件。我们制定了在流动公平制约下最大限度地增加最坏情况的收入的线性方案,我们充分描述最佳解决办法。最后,我们通过提供一个数字示例来说明拟议框架,从而结束我们的工作。