We study problems arising in real-time auction markets, common in e-commerce and computational advertising, where bidders face the problem of calculating optimal bids. We focus upon a contract management problem where a demand aggregator is subject to multiple contractual obligations requiring them to acquire items of heterogeneous types at a specified rate, which they will seek to fulfill at minimum cost. Our main results show that, through a transformation of variables, this problem can be formulated as a convex optimization problem, for both first and second price auctions. Convexity results in efficient algorithms for solving instances of this problem, and the resulting duality theory admits rich structure and interpretations. Additionally, we show that the transformation of variables used to formulate this problem as a convex program can also be used to guarantee the convexity of optimal bidding problems studied by other authors (who did not leverage convexity). Finally, we show how the expected cost of bidding in second price auctions is formally identical to certain transaction costs when submitting market orders in limit order book markets. This fact is used to analyze a Markowitz portfolio problem which accounts for these transaction costs, establishing an interesting connection between finance and optimal bidding.
翻译:我们研究的是实时拍卖市场中出现的问题,这种市场在电子商务和计算广告中很常见,投标人面临计算最佳出价的问题。我们注重的是合同管理问题,即需求聚合者必须承担多种合同义务,要求他们以规定的速度获得不同种类的项目,这些产品将设法以最低的成本完成。我们的主要结果显示,通过变式转换,这个问题可以在第一次和第二次价格拍卖中被描述成一个螺旋式优化问题。稳妥导致解决问题的高效算法,由此产生的双重理论承认了丰富的结构和解释。此外,我们表明,用于形成这一问题的变数变数,作为一种共通程序,也可以用来保证其他作者研究过的最佳投标问题的共性(他们没有利用共通率 ) 。 最后,我们表明,第二次价格拍卖的预期投标成本在提交市场定购单时,与某些交易成本完全相同。 这一事实被用来分析马克威茨证券组合问题,这些交易成本的账户是这些交易成本,在融资和最佳投标之间建立有趣的联系。