Electrical substations are becoming more prone to cyber-attacks due to increasing digitalization. Prevailing defense measures based on cyber rules are often inadequate to detect attacks that use legitimate-looking measurements. In this work, we design and implement a bad data detection solution for electrical substations called ResiGate, that effectively combines a physics-based approach and a machine-learning-based approach to provide substantial speed-up in high-throughput substation communication scenarios, while still maintaining high detection accuracy and confidence. While many existing physics-based schemes are designed for deployment in control centers (due to their high computational requirement), ResiGate is designed as a security appliance that can be deployed on low-cost industrial computers at the edge of the smart grid so that it can detect local substation-level attacks in a timely manner. A key challenge for this is to continuously run the computationally demanding physics-based analysis to monitor the measurement data frequently transmitted in a typical substation. To provide high throughput without sacrificing accuracy, ResiGate uses machine learning to effectively filter out most of the non-suspicious (normal) data and thereby reducing the overall computational load, allowing efficient performance even with a high volume of network traffic. We implement ResiGate on a low-cost industrial computer and our experiments confirm that ResiGate can detect attacks with zero error while sustaining a high throughput.
翻译:由于数字化程度的提高,电子站越来越容易受到网络攻击。基于网络规则的防御措施往往不足以检测使用合法视觉测量手段的袭击。在这项工作中,我们设计和实施一个称为ResiGate的电子站数据检测不良解决方案,有效地结合了物理方法和机学习方法,以便在高通量子站通信情况下提供大量快速传输,同时仍然保持高检测准确性和信心。虽然许多基于物理的现有计划是设计用于在控制中心部署的(由于其高计算要求),但ResiGate的设计是一种安全设备,可以部署在智能电网边缘的低成本工业计算机上,以便它能够及时检测当地次站级袭击。这方面的一个重大挑战是持续进行基于物理的计算分析,以监测在典型的子站中经常传输的测量数据。在不牺牲准确性的情况下提供高通量,ResiGate利用机器学习有效地过滤大部分非可靠的(正常)数据,从而减少在高成本工业网络上的低成本工业计算机袭击,同时允许高效地进行高成本的计算机测试。