Front-running attacks, which benefit from advanced knowledge of pending transactions, have proliferated in the cryptocurrency space since the emergence of decentralized finance. Front-running causes devastating losses to honest participants$\unicode{x2013}$estimated at \$280M each month$\unicode{x2013}$and endangers the fairness of the ecosystem. We present Flash Freezing Flash Boys (F3B), a blockchain architecture to address front-running attacks by relying on a commit-and-reveal scheme where the contents of transactions are encrypted and later revealed by a decentralized secret-management committee once the underlying consensus layer has committed the transaction. F3B mitigates front-running attacks because an adversary can no longer read the content of a transaction before commitment, thus preventing the adversary from benefiting from advance knowledge of pending transactions. We design F3B to be agnostic to the underlying consensus algorithm and compatible with legacy smart contracts by addressing front-running at the blockchain architecture level. Unlike existing commit-and-reveal approaches, F3B only requires writing data onto the underlying blockchain once, establishing a significant overhead reduction. An exploration of F3B shows that with a secret-management committee consisting of 8 and 128 members, F3B presents between 0.1 and 1.8 seconds of transaction-processing latency, respectively.
翻译:远期袭击得益于对待决交易的先进知识,自分散化金融出现以来,在加密货币空间中扩散了。前期袭击给诚实的参与者造成了毁灭性损失,因为诚实的参与者每月$\uncode{x2013}$估计为280M美元,估计每月$280M元,危及生态系统的公平性。我们介绍了闪电冷冻闪电闪电男孩(F3B),这是一个应对前期袭击的链条结构,它依靠一个承诺和回收计划,即交易内容加密,随后由一个分散的保密管理委员会披露,一旦基本共识层进行交易,F3B只需将数据写入基本的链条,确定重大的间接削减。因为对手无法在承诺前再阅读交易的内容,从而无法从预先了解待决交易中获益。我们设计F3B,以对基本共识算法的敏感度,并通过在链条结构层面进行前端操作,与遗留的智能合同兼容。与现有的承诺和回报方法不同,F3B只要求将数据写在基本链条链条上一次,确定重大的间接削减。