The widespread adoption of voice-activated systems has modified routine human-machine interaction but has also introduced new vulnerabilities. This paper investigates the susceptibility of automatic speech recognition (ASR) algorithms in these systems to interference from near-ultrasonic noise. Building upon prior research that demonstrated the ability of near-ultrasonic frequencies (16 kHz - 22 kHz) to exploit the inherent properties of microelectromechanical systems (MEMS) microphones, our study explores alternative privacy enforcement means using this interference phenomenon. We expose a critical vulnerability in the most common microphones used in modern voice-activated devices, which inadvertently demodulate near-ultrasonic frequencies into the audible spectrum, disrupting the ASR process. Through a systematic analysis of the impact of near-ultrasonic noise on various ASR systems, we demonstrate that this vulnerability is consistent across different devices and under varying conditions, such as broadcast distance and specific phoneme structures. Our findings highlight the need to develop robust countermeasures to protect voice-activated systems from malicious exploitation of this vulnerability. Furthermore, we explore the potential applications of this phenomenon in enhancing privacy by disrupting unauthorized audio recording or eavesdropping. This research underscores the importance of a comprehensive approach to securing voice-activated systems, combining technological innovation, responsible development practices, and informed policy decisions to ensure the privacy and security of users in an increasingly connected world.
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