A SCADA system is a distributed network of cyber-physical devices used for instrumentation and control of critical infrastructures such as an electric power grid. With the emergence of the smart grid, SCADA systems are increasingly required to be connected to more open systems and security becomes crucial. However, many of these SCADA systems have been deployed for decades and were initially not designed with security in mind. In particular, the field devices in these systems are vulnerable to false command injection from an intruding or compromised device. But implementing cryptographic defence on these old-generation devices is challenging due to their computation constraints. As a key requirement, solutions to protect legacy SCADA systems have to be an add-on. This paper discusses two add-on defence strategies for legacy SCADA systems -- the data diode and the detect-and-respond approach -- and compares their security guarantees and applicable scenarios. A generic architectural framework is also proposed to implement the detect-and-respond strategy, with an instantiation to demonstrate its practicality.
翻译:SCADA系统是一个分布式的网络物理装置网络,用来对电网等关键基础设施进行仪器操作和控制,随着智能电网的出现,SCADA系统越来越需要与更开放的系统连接,安全也变得至关重要。然而,许多SCADA系统已经部署了几十年,最初设计时没有考虑到安全。特别是,这些系统中的实地装置很容易受到受到受到干扰或损坏装置的虚假指令注射。但是,由于这些老旧装置的计算限制,对这些装置实施加密防御具有挑战性。作为关键要求,保护遗留的SCADAD系统的解决办法必须是附加的。本文讨论了遗留的SCADA系统的两个附加防御战略 -- -- 数据二极管和探测与响应方法 -- 并比较其安全保障和适用情景。还提议了一个通用的建筑框架,以实施探测与响应战略,同时说明其实用性。