Second-price auctions with deposits are frequently used in blockchain environments. An auction takes place on-chain: bidders deposit an amount that fully covers their bid (but possibly exceeds it) in a smart contract. The deposit is used as insurance against bidders not honoring their bid if they win. The deposit, but not the bid, is publicly observed during the bidding phase of the auction. The visibility of deposits can fundamentally change the strategic structure of the auction if bidding happens sequentially: Bidding is costly since deposit are costly to make. Thus, deposits can be used as a costly signal for a high valuation. This is the source of multiple inefficiencies: To engage in costly signalling, a bidder who bids first and has a high valuation will generally over-deposit in equilibrium, i.e.~deposit more than he will bid. If high valuations are likely there can, moreover, be entry deterrence through high deposits: a bidder who bids first can deter subsequent bidders from entering the auction. Pooling can happen in equilibrium, where bidders of different valuations deposit the same amount. The auction fails to allocate the item to the bidder with the highest valuation.
翻译:含有押金的第二次价格拍卖经常在连锁环境中使用。 拍卖是在一连串环境中进行的: 投标人将完全覆盖其出价( 但可能超过出价)的数额存入智能合同中。 押金是用来作为对在胜出时不兑现出价的投标人的保险。 在拍卖的投标阶段公开看到存款,而不是出价。 如果投标按顺序进行,存款的可见性将从根本上改变拍卖的战略结构: 投标费用昂贵,因为存款费用昂贵。 因此, 存款可以用作高价值的昂贵信号。 这是多种效率低下的根源: 进行费用高昂的信号, 首先出价并拥有高价值的投标人将普遍超额均衡地放弃出价, 也就是说, 出价将超过出价。 此外, 如果高价值有可能通过高押金产生入场威慑力: 首先出价的投标人可以阻止随后的投标人参加拍卖。 联营可以发生在平衡中, 不同估值的投标人将同样数额存入同一数额的价款。 拍卖无法将物品分配给出价人。