Outsourced training and machine learning as a service have resulted in novel attack vectors like backdoor attacks. Such attacks embed a secret functionality in a neural network activated when the trigger is added to its input. In most works in the literature, the trigger is static, both in terms of location and pattern. The effectiveness of various detection mechanisms depends on this property. It was recently shown that countermeasures in image classification, like Neural Cleanse and ABS, could be bypassed with dynamic triggers that are effective regardless of their pattern and location. Still, such backdoors are demanding as they require a large percentage of poisoned training data. In this work, we are the first to show that dynamic backdoor attacks could happen due to a global average pooling layer without increasing the percentage of the poisoned training data. Nevertheless, our experiments in sound classification, text sentiment analysis, and image classification show this to be very difficult in practice.
翻译:外源培训和机器学习作为一种服务,已经产生了新颖的攻击矢量,如后门攻击。这种攻击将一个秘密功能嵌入神经网络中,当触发器添加到输入时就激活了。在文献的多数作品中,触发器在位置和模式上都是静态的。各种检测机制的有效性取决于这一属性。最近显示,图像分类中的应对措施,如神经清洁和ABS,可以绕过有效的动态触发器,不管其模式和位置如何。然而,这类后门要求很高,因为它们需要大量有毒的培训数据。在这项工作中,我们首先表明动态后门攻击可能发生的原因是全球平均集合层,而不会增加中毒培训数据的百分比。然而,我们在声音分类、文字情绪分析和图像分类方面的实验表明,这在实践中非常困难。