Replay-based Recovery for Autonomous Robotic Vehicles from Sensor Deception Attacks

Sensors are crucial for autonomous operation in robotic vehicles (RV). Physical attacks on sensors such as sensor tampering or spoofing can feed erroneous values to RVs through physical channels, which results in mission failures. In this paper, we present DeLorean, a comprehensive diagnosis and recovery framework for securing autonomous RVs from physical attacks. We consider a strong form of physical attack called sensor deception attacks (SDAs), in which the adversary targets multiple sensors of different types simultaneously (even including all sensors). Under SDAs, DeLorean inspects the attack induced errors, identifies the targeted sensors, and prevents the erroneous sensor inputs from being used in RV's feedback control loop. DeLorean replays historic state information in the feedback control loop and recovers the RV from attacks. Our evaluation on four real and two simulated RVs shows that DeLorean can recover RVs from different attacks, and ensure mission success in 94% of the cases (on average), without any crashes. DeLorean incurs low performance, memory and battery overheads.