We consider the bilateral trade problem, in which two agents trade a single indivisible item. It is known that the only dominant-strategy truthful mechanism is the fixed-price mechanism: given commonly known distributions of the buyer's value $B$ and the seller's value $S$, a price $p$ is offered to both agents and trade occurs if $S \leq p < B$. The objective is to maximize either expected welfare $\mathbb{E}[S + (B-S) \mathbf{1}_{S \leq p < B}]$ or expected gains from trade $\mathbb{E}[(B-S) \mathbf{1}_{S \leq p < B}]$. We determine the optimal approximation ratio for several variants of the problem. When the agents' distributions are identical, we show that the optimal approximation ratio for welfare is $\frac{2+\sqrt{2}}{4}$. The optimal approximation for gains from trade in this case was known to be $1/2$; we show that this can be achieved even with just $1$ sample from the common distribution. We also show that a $3/4$-approximation to welfare can be achieved with $1$ sample from the common distribution. When agents' distributions are not required to be identical, we show that a previously best-known $(1-1/e)$-approximation can be strictly improved, but $1-1/e$ is optimal if only the seller's distribution is known.
翻译:我们考虑的是双边贸易问题,即两个代理商交易一个不可分割的物品。众所周知,唯一的主导战略真实机制是固定价格机制:根据众所周知的买方价值美元B$和卖方价值美元的分配,向代理商和交易双方提供美元价格,如果美元S\leqp p < B$,那么问题的若干变种的最佳近似率就会发生。当代理商的分布相同时,我们表明福利的最佳近似率是$forc{2\S)\mathb{{{S\\leqp{B}1\S\leq p <B}美元或贸易预期收益$mathbb{E}[(B-S)\mathb$美元和卖方价值S$的分布,如果我们所知道的贸易收益的最佳近似比值不是$1/2美元,那么我们从共同的销售量到比值的销售量也能够达到。