Here we consider the communications tactics appropriate for a group of agents that need to ``swarm'' together in a highly adversarial environment. Specifically, whilst they need to exchange information with each other about their location and their plans; at the same time they also need to keep such communications to an absolute minimum. This might be due to a need for stealth, or otherwise be relevant to situations where communications are significantly restricted. Complicating this process is that we assume each agent has (a) no means of passively locating others, (b) it must rely on being updated by reception of appropriate messages; and if no such update messages arrive, (c) then their own beliefs about other agents will gradually become out of date and increasingly inaccurate. Here we use a geometry-free multi-agent model that is capable of allowing for message-based information transfer between agents with different intrinsic connectivities, as would be present in a spatial arrangement of agents. We present agent-centric performance metrics that require only minimal assumptions, and show how simulated outcome distributions, risks, and connectivities depend on the ratio of information gain to loss. We also show that checking for too-long round-trip-times can be an effective minimal-information filter for determining which agents to no longer target with messages.
翻译:我们在这里考虑适合一组在高度对抗环境下需要“感应”的代理商的通信策略。 具体地说, 他们需要相互交换有关其位置和计划的信息; 同时, 他们也需要将这种通信保持在绝对的最低限度; 这可能是由于需要隐蔽, 或者与通信受到极大限制的情况相关。 这一过程的复杂之处是, 我们假设每个代理商都不具备被动定位他人的手段, (b) 它必须依靠接收适当信息来更新信息;(c) 如果这种更新信息没有到达, 则他们自己对其他代理商的信念将逐渐过时, 并且越来越不准确。 我们在这里使用一种无地测量的多代理商模型, 能够允许在具有不同内在连接的代理商之间进行基于信息的信息信息的信息传输, 正如在代理商的空间安排中那样。 我们提出的以代理商为中心的性业绩衡量标准只需要最起码的假设, 并显示模拟的结果分配、 风险和连接取决于信息获取损失的比例, (c) 然后他们自己对其他代理商的信念将逐渐过时, 并且越来越不准确。 我们还表明, 检查是否要检查过低的代理商, 以便检查过低时间检查过量的信息。