Prior work has identified a resilient phenomenon that threatens the performance of human-AI decision-making teams: overreliance, when people agree with an AI, even when it is incorrect. Surprisingly, overreliance does not reduce when the AI produces explanations for its predictions, compared to only providing predictions. Some have argued that overreliance results from cognitive biases or uncalibrated trust, attributing overreliance to an inevitability of human cognition. By contrast, our paper argues that people strategically choose whether or not to engage with an AI explanation, demonstrating empirically that there are scenarios where AI explanations reduce overreliance. To achieve this, we formalize this strategic choice in a cost-benefit framework, where the costs and benefits of engaging with the task are weighed against the costs and benefits of relying on the AI. We manipulate the costs and benefits in a maze task, where participants collaborate with a simulated AI to find the exit of a maze. Through 5 studies (N = 731), we find that costs such as task difficulty (Study 1), explanation difficulty (Study 2, 3), and benefits such as monetary compensation (Study 4) affect overreliance. Finally, Study 5 adapts the Cognitive Effort Discounting paradigm to quantify the utility of different explanations, providing further support for our framework. Our results suggest that some of the null effects found in literature could be due in part to the explanation not sufficiently reducing the costs of verifying the AI's prediction.
翻译:先前的工作已经发现一个有弹性的现象,威胁到人类-大赦国际决策团队的绩效:当人们同意AI时,即使不正确,也存在过度依赖,即使不正确;令人惊讶的是,如果AI对其预测作出解释,那么与仅仅提供预测相比,过度依赖并不减少;一些人认为,过度依赖是认知偏见或未经校正的信任的结果,将过度依赖归咎于人类认知的必然性;相比之下,我们的文件认为,人们从战略上选择是否与AI解释接触,从经验上表明,存在AI解释减少过度依赖的情况。为了实现这一目标,我们将这一战略选择正式化为成本效益框架,将参与这项任务的成本和效益与依赖AI的成本和效益加以权衡。我们在一项迷宫任务中操纵了成本和效益,将过度依赖人类认知的不可避免性归结,通过5项研究(N= 731),我们发现,诸如任务困难(研究1),解释困难(研究2),解释困难(研究3),以及货币补偿(研究4)等利益,将参与这项工作的成本与依赖AI的成本效益加以权衡,从而量化解释。