In this paper, we study a routing and travel-mode choice problem for mobility systems with a multimodal transportation network as a ``mobility game" with coupled action sets. We develop a game-theoretic framework to study the impact on efficiency of the travelers' behavioral decision-making. In our framework, we introduce a mobility ``pricing mechanism," in which we model traffic congestion using linear cost functions while also considering the waiting times at different transport hubs. We show that the travelers' selfish actions lead to a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. We then perform a Price of Anarchy analysis to establish that the mobility system's inefficiencies remain relatively low as the number of travelers increases. We deviate from the standard game-theoretic analysis of decision-making by extending our modeling framework to capture the subjective behavior of travelers using prospect theory. Finally, we provide a simulation study as a proof of concept for our proposed mobility game.
翻译:在本文中,我们研究了以多式联运网络为“流动游戏”的移动系统路线和旅行模式选择问题,并结合了行动组合。我们开发了一个游戏理论框架,研究对旅行者行为决策效率的影响。在我们的框架内,我们引入了流动性“定价机制 ”, 使用线性成本功能来模拟交通拥堵,同时考虑不同运输枢纽的等待时间。我们表明,旅行者的自私行为导致了纯战略的纳什平衡。我们随后进行了无序价格分析,以确定随着旅行者人数的增加,流动系统的效率仍然相对较低。我们偏离了标准的游戏理论决策分析,扩大了我们的模型框架,利用前景理论捕捉旅行者的主观行为。最后,我们提供了模拟研究,作为我们拟议流动游戏概念的证明。