Computational accounts of purposeful behavior consist of descriptive and normative aspects. The former enable agents to ascertain the current (or future) state of affairs in the world and the latter to evaluate the desirability, or lack thereof, of these states with respect to the agent's goals. In Reinforcement Learning, the normative aspect (reward and value functions) is assumed to depend on a pre-defined and fixed descriptive one (state representation). Alternatively, these two aspects may emerge interdependently: goals can be, and indeed often are, expressed in terms of state representation features, but they may also serve to shape state representations themselves. Here, we illustrate a novel theoretical framing of state representation learning in bounded agents, coupling descriptive and normative aspects via the notion of goal-directed, or telic, states. We define a new controllability property of telic state representations to characterize the tradeoff between their granularity and the policy complexity capacity required to reach all telic states. We propose an algorithm for learning controllable state representations and demonstrate it using a simple navigation task with changing goals. Our framework highlights the crucial role of deliberate ignorance - knowing what to ignore - for learning state representations that are both goal-flexible and simple. More broadly, our work provides a concrete step towards a unified theoretical view of natural and artificial learning through the lens of goals.
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