"Egyptian Ratscrew" (ERS) is a modern American card game enjoyed by millions of players worldwide. A game of ERS is won by collecting all of the cards in the deck. Typically this game is won by the player with the fastest reflexes, since the most common strategy for collecting cards is being the first to slap the pile in the center whenever legal combinations of cards are placed down. Most players assume that the dominant strategy is to develop a faster reaction time than your opponents, and no academic inquiry has been levied against this assumption. This thesis investigates the hypothesis that a "risk slapping" strategist who relies on practical economic decision making will win an overwhelming majority of games against players who rely on quick reflexes alone. It is theorized that this can be done by exploiting the "burn rule," a penalty that is too low-cost to effectively dissuade players from slapping illegally when it benefits them. Using the Ruby programming language, we construct an Egyptian Ratscrew simulator from scratch. Our model allows us to simulate the behavior of 8 strategically unique players within easily adjustable parameters including simulation type, player count, and burn amount. We simulate 100k iterations of 67 different ERS games, totaling 6.7 million games of ERS, and use win percentage data in order to determine which strategies are dominant under each set of parameters. We then confirm our hypothesis that risk slapping is a dominant strategy, discover that there is no strictly dominant approach to risk slapping, and elucidate a deeper understanding of different ERS mechanics such as the burn rule. Finally, we assess the implications of our findings and suggest potential improvements to the rules of the game. We also touch on the real-world applications of our research and make recommendations for the future of Egyptian Ratscrew modeling.
翻译:"埃及老鼠夹"(ERS)是一种现代的美式纸牌游戏,受到全球数百万玩家的喜爱。ERS的游戏通过收集整个牌组来获胜。通常这个游戏由反应速度最快的玩家赢得,因为收集纸牌的最常见策略就是在合法的卡牌组合被放下时首先拍打中心的牌堆。大多数玩家认为主导策略是开发比对手更快的反应时间,而这种假设还没有受到学术调查的追问。本论文研究了一个假设,即依赖实用经济决策的“风险拍打”策略家将在与仅依赖快速反应的玩家的绝大多数游戏中获胜。理论上,可以通过利用“烧掉规则”来达成这一目标,这是一种惩罚行为,其成本过低,无法有效地阻止玩家在其获益时非法拍打牌堆。使用Ruby编程语言,我们从头开始构建了一个埃及老鼠夹模拟器。我们的模型允许我们在易于调整的参数下模拟8个具有战略性的独特玩家的行为,包括模拟类型、玩家数量和烧伤量。我们模拟了67种不同的ERS游戏的10万次迭代,总共进行了670万次ERS游戏,并利用获胜百分比数据确定每组参数下的主导策略。然后我们验证了我们的假设,即风险拍打是一种主导策略,发现没有严格的风险拍打方法,阐明了更深入的ERS机制,如烧伤规则。最后,我们评估了我们的研究成果的影响,并建议改进游戏规则的潜在方案。我们还触及了我们研究的现实应用,并为埃及老鼠夹建模的未来提出了建议。