Several proof-of-stake blockchains allow for "staking pools", i.e. agents interested in validating transactions can open a pool to which others can delegate their stake. We develop a game-theoretic model of staking pool formation in the presence of malicious agents who want to disrupt the blockchain. We establish the existence and uniqueness of equilibria. Moreover, we identify the potential and risk of staking pools. First, staking pools can never increase current blockchain security over a system in which such pools are not allowed. Yet, by optimally selecting the distribution of the validation returns, honest stakeholders obtain higher returns, which may be beneficial for future blockchain operations. Second, by choosing welfare optimal distribution rewards, staking pools prevent from allocating large rewards to malicious agents. Third, when pool owners can freely distribute the returns from validation to delegators, staking pools disrupt blockchain operations, since malicious agents attract all delegators by distributing most of the returns to them.
翻译：多个控制区链的验证允许“ 吸收池 ”, 即对验证交易感兴趣的代理人可以打开其他人可以委托其参与的集合。 我们开发了一个游戏理论模型,让恶意代理人在想要扰乱这一链条的恶意代理人在场的情况下组成吸收池。 我们建立了平衡的存在和独特性。 此外, 我们确定了吸收池的潜力和风险。 首先, 吸收池永远不可能增加不允许这种集合的系统的当前供应链安全性。 然而,通过最佳地选择验证收益的分配,诚实的利益有关者可以获得更高的回报,这可能有利于今后的链条操作。 其次, 选择福利最佳分配奖励, 利用集合防止向恶意代理人分配大额报酬。 第三, 集合所有人可以将验证产生的收益自由分配给拆散者, 扣押集合扰乱障碍操作, 因为恶意代理人通过将大部分收益分配给他们来吸引所有拆散者。
相关内容
微信扫码咨询专知VIP会员