Large Language Models (LLMs) present a dual-use dilemma: they enable beneficial applications while harboring potential for harm, particularly through conversational interactions. Despite various safeguards, advanced LLMs remain vulnerable. A watershed case was Kevin Roose's notable conversation with Bing, which elicited harmful outputs after extended interaction. This contrasts with simpler early jailbreaks that produced similar content more easily, raising the question: How much conversational effort is needed to elicit harmful information from LLMs? We propose two measures: Conversational Length (CL), which quantifies the conversation length used to obtain a specific response, and Conversational Complexity (CC), defined as the Kolmogorov complexity of the user's instruction sequence leading to the response. To address the incomputability of Kolmogorov complexity, we approximate CC using a reference LLM to estimate the compressibility of user instructions. Applying this approach to a large red-teaming dataset, we perform a quantitative analysis examining the statistical distribution of harmful and harmless conversational lengths and complexities. Our empirical findings suggest that this distributional analysis and the minimisation of CC serve as valuable tools for understanding AI safety, offering insights into the accessibility of harmful information. This work establishes a foundation for a new perspective on LLM safety, centered around the algorithmic complexity of pathways to harm.
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