Price Experimentation and Interference in Online Platforms

In this paper, we examine the biases arising in A/B tests where a firm modifies a continuous parameter, such as price, to estimate the global treatment effect associated to a given performance metric. Such biases emerge from canonical designs and estimators due to interference among market participants. We employ structural modeling and differential calculus to derive intuitive structural characterizations of this bias. We then specialize our general model to a standard revenue management pricing problem. This setting highlights a key potential pitfall in the use of pricing experiments to guide profit maximization: notably, the canonical estimator for the change in profits can have the {\em wrong sign}. In other words, following the guidance of the canonical estimator may lead the firm to move prices in the wrong direction, and thereby decrease profits relative to the status quo. We apply these results to a two-sided market model and show how this ``change of sign" regime depends on model parameters, and discuss structural and practical implications for platform operators.