We consider the social welfare that can be facilitated by a constant function market maker (CFMM). When there is sufficient liquidity available to the CFMM, it can approximate the optimal social welfare when all users transactions are executed. When one of the agent has the role of proposing the block, and blockspace is scarce, they can obtain higher expected utility than otherwise identical agents. This gives a lower bound on the maximal extractable value exposed when blockspace is scarce.
翻译:我们考虑的是固定功能市场制造商(CFMM)能够促进的社会福利。 当固定功能市场制造商(CFMM)有足够的流动资金时,它可以在所有用户交易进行时接近最佳社会福利。 当一个代理商负责提出区块建议,而区块空间稀少时,他们可以得到比其他相同代理商更高的预期效用。 这使得当块块空间稀缺时所暴露的最大可提取值的界限较低。