PPP项目特许经营合同再谈判与补偿机制研究

项目名称： PPP项目特许经营合同再谈判与补偿机制研究

项目编号： No.71472052

项目类型： 面上项目

立项/批准年度： 2015

项目学科： 管理科学

项目作者： 张学清

作者单位： 广州市香港科大霍英东研究院

项目金额： 60万元

中文摘要： 公私合作伙伴模式（PPP）在国内外广泛应用。由于PPP项目的复杂性以及特许经营合同的不完全性，项目在运营过程中常常会出现严重的风险状况，政府和私营方被迫对项目进行再谈判。本研究拟主要解决再谈判的三个核心问题。第一个核心问题是构建再谈判预防机制，通过合同与机制设计，减小特许经营合同的不完全性，以减少再谈判发生的概率。本研究将通过案例分析和问卷调查来识别再谈判关键诱因与路径，从而达到预防的目的。第二个核心问题是设计合理的公私双方再谈判决策机制。本研究将运用博弈论来构建双方的决策模型，从而确定双方的最优决策和识别机会主义行为。第三个核心问题是构建公私双赢的补偿机制和补偿额测算模型。本研究将通过风险分析，现金流分析，蒙特卡洛模拟来解决该问题，并运用于实际案例中。通过对PPP实践中发生的再谈判问题从理论与实际操作两个层面深入分析，本研究成果将对PPP的应用与发展具有重要的促进作用。

中文关键词： 公私合作伙伴模式；不完全契约；再谈判；博弈论；补偿

英文摘要： Many infrastructure projects have been successfully developed around the world through public-private partnerships (PPPs). At the same time, various problems and even bankruptcy have occurred in a number of PPP projects due to the complexity of PPP projects and the incompleteness of concession contracts. It is impossible for concession contracts to describe all uncertainties and contingencies in the long concession period and many serious risk scenarios could occur and cause tremendous problems to the projects. In such occasions, the government has to bailout the project through renegotiation so as to prevent social welfare losses caused by these problems. In renegotiation, risks and benefits are re-shared between the public and private sectors and the government may pay compensation to the private sector if necessary to enable it to maintain the normal operation of the project. This research will focus on three core problems with regard to the renegotiation of PPP contracts. First, a renegotiation prevention mechanism will be built for the purpose of reducing the chance of renegotiations by identifying the driving factors, establishing the cause-effect paths, and reducing the degree of contract incompleteness through questionnaire surveys and case studies. Second, renegotiation decision-making models of both the government and the private sector will be developed based on game theory, which facilitate the analysis of the timing of the private sector to raise the issue of renegotiation or the timing of the public sector to accept it and can identify the optimal strategies and opportunistic behaviors of both sectors. Third, a quantitative renegotiation compensation model will be developed through cash flow analysis and Monte Carlo simulation, and applied to a real sample case to demonstrate its usefulness. In summary, this research will provide in-depth analysis of the various issues in renegotiation from both theoretical and practical aspects and the outputs of this research will promote the successful development and application of PPPs in more and more projects in different areas.

英文关键词： Public private partnerships;incomplete contract;renegotiation;game theory;compensation