基于博弈论的我国转轨期集体腐败的实证研究

项目名称： 基于博弈论的我国转轨期集体腐败的实证研究

项目编号： No.70803025

项目类型： 青年科学基金项目

立项/批准年度： 2009

项目学科： 金属学与金属工艺

项目作者： 过勇

作者单位： 清华大学

项目金额： 17万元

中文摘要： 集体腐败已经成为当前我国各类腐败现象的一个重要共同特征，也是腐败的一个重要发展趋势。然而国内外关于集体腐败行为的研究相对缺乏，尤其是缺乏实证研究成果。集体腐败通常指的是官员之间共谋进行腐败行为的一种现象，它与个人腐败、单位腐败之间有着明显的区别。在清楚界定集体腐败定义和类型的基础上，本研究拟运用博弈论对集体腐败发生、发展和暴露的各个环节进行分析，建立博弈模型。在此基础上，通过典型案例分析和案例库研究，用实证的方法验证集体腐败发生的机制，特别是集体腐败成员自利动机和集体利益的矛盾，并对转轨期我国个人腐败、集体腐败和单位腐败的相对变化情况及成因做初步分析。在此基础上，运用利益相关者分析，对反腐败机关、司法机关、普通群众和腐败的直接受害者等在集体腐败中的角色进行探讨，评估相关制度的有效性。本研究通过对集体腐败行为模式和成因的深入分析，从而得出对我国反腐败工作切实有用的政策工具和启示。

中文关键词： 腐败；集体腐败；转轨期；博弈论；实证研究

英文摘要： Collective corruption has become an important character and evolving trend of corruption in contemporary China. However, there are few domestic and international literature on it, especially empirical studies. Usually, collective corruption refers to collusion among public officials to carry out corruption activities. It is distinguished from individual corruption or organizational corruption in terms of actor of illegal activities. This project will clearly define and classify collective corruption, and apply the game theory to analyze, and constitute a game theory model regarding, its occurrence, development and exposure. Then this project will also adopt empirical method to verify the evolving mechanism of collective corruption, especially the conflict between public officials' self-interests and collective interests, and analyze the change and causes of individual corruption, collective corruption and organizational corruption in China's transition period. Finally, through a stakeholder analysis, this project will discuss the roles and effect of the anticorruption authorities, judiciary, civil society and direct victims in collective corruption. This project aims to provide useful policy tools for China's fight against corruption, by in-depth research on the behavior model and causes of collective corruption in transitional China.

英文关键词： corruption; collective corruption; transition period; game theory; empirical analysis