项目名称: 小种群效应、网络结构及激励机制对合作行为演化动态的影响
项目编号: No.31270439
项目类型: 面上项目
立项/批准年度: 2013
项目学科: 生物科学
项目作者: 陶毅
作者单位: 中国科学院动物研究所
项目金额: 84万元
中文摘要: 合作行为的进化是进化生物学最重要的理论问题之一。如果合作个体为了帮助其他个体而牺牲自己的利益(适合度),那么在自然选择的压力下合作行为是怎样在种群中被长期保存下来的?小种群的随机效应,个体间相互作用的网络结构,以及个体对激励机制(惩罚和奖励)的响应是近年来在合作行为研究中的热点问题,它们对于解释合作行为在种群中的演化动态有重要的理论意义。本项目将以囚徒困境博弈和公用品博弈为基础,应用随机进化博弈动力学,网络博弈动力学和实验博弈的方法,深入分析1/3定律在随机进化博弈中的进化生物学含义,网络结构对于合作行为演化动态的效应,个体对激励机制的响应,以及自主激励和制度性激励之间的相互演化关系。这些结果将不仅会为合作行为理论的发展做出有意义的贡献,而且也将会为解释在自然种群和人类社会中合作行为的维持和演化提供新的理论依据。
中文关键词: 有限种群;网络结构;1/3 定律;制度性激励;合作行为动态
英文摘要: The evolution of cooperation is one of the most important theoretical problems in evolutionary biology. The key question in the evolution of cooperation is how cooperation behavior is maintained under natural selection if an individual will be incurred a cost in fitness because of his/her cooperation. Recently, people are interested in the effect of infinite population on the emergence of cooperation, the effect of network structure on cooperation dynamics, and the effect of peer and institutional incentives on promoting cooperation since these theoretical questions are very important for understanding cooperation dynamics in the population. In this project, the evolutionary significance of 1/3 law in stochastic evolutionary game dynamics, the effect of network structure on cooperation, individuals' response for the incentives, and the relationship between the peer and institutional incentives will be analyzed using the classic PD and PGG games. Our main goal is to provide some new insights, concepts and methods for explaining the maintenance of cooperation in the population.
英文关键词: infinite population;network structure;1/3 law;institutional incentive;cooperation dynamics