Phasor measurement units (PMUs) provide accurate and high-fidelity measurements in order to monitor the state of the power grid and support various control and planning tasks. However, PMUs have a high installation cost prohibiting their massive deployment. Minimizing the number of installed PMUs needs to be achieved while also maintaining full observability of the network. At the same time, data integrity attacks on PMU measurements can cause mislead power system control and operation routines. In this paper, a bi-level stochastic non-cooperative game-based placement model is proposed for PMU allocation in the presence of cyber-attack risks. In the first level, the protection of individual PMU placed in a network is addressed, while considering the interaction between the grid operator and the attacker with respective resource constraints. In the second level, the attacker observes the placement of the PMUs and compromises them, with the aim of maximizing the state estimation error and reducing the observability of the network. The proposed technique is deployed in the IEEE-9 bus test system. The results demonstrate a 9% reduction in the cost incurred by the power grid operator for deploying PMUs while considering cyber-risks.
翻译:为了监测电网状况,支持各种控制和规划任务,PMU测量单元提供准确和高纤维度量测量,以监测电网状况,支持各种控制和规划任务;然而,PMU的安装费用高昂,禁止大规模部署;需要实现已安装的PMU数目的最小化,同时保持网络的完全可操作性;同时,对PMU测量的数据完整性攻击可导致误导电力系统控制和运行常规;本文件提议,在网络攻击风险的情况下,为PMU分配双级随机不合作的游戏定位模型;在第一级,在考虑电网操作员与攻击者之间在各种资源限制方面的相互作用的同时,处理对安装在网络中的单个PMU的保护问题;在第二级,攻击者观察PMU的位置并进行妥协,目的是尽量扩大国家估计错误并减少网络的可观测性;拟议技术部署在IEE-9公共汽车测试系统;结果显示,电网操作员在考虑网络风险的同时部署PMU的费用将减少9%。