Byzantine fault-tolerant (BFT) state machine replication (SMR) has been studied for over 30 years. Recently it has received more attention due to its application in permissioned blockchain systems. A sequence of research efforts focuses on improving the commit latency of the SMR protocol in the common good case, including PBFT with $3$-round latency and $n\geq 3f+1$ and FaB with $2$-round latency and $n\geq 5f+1$. In this paper, we propose an authenticated protocol that solves $2$-round BFT SMR with only $n\geq 5f-1$ replicas, which refutes the optimal resiliency claim made in FaB for needing $n \geq 5f+1$ for $2$-round PBFT-style BFT protocols. For the special case when $f=1$, our protocol needs only $4$ replicas, and strictly improves PBFT by reducing the latency by one round (even when one backup is faulty).
翻译:拜占庭断裂性国家机器复制(BFT)研究已超过30年,最近由于在特许的区块链系统中应用而得到更多关注,一系列研究工作的重点是改善共同公益案件中SMR协议的承接时间,包括3美元圆延和3美元+1美元的PBFT和2美元圆延延和5美元+1美元的FAB。在本论文中,我们提议一项经认证的协议,只用5美元-1美元的复制品解决2美元圆环BFT SMR,这驳斥了FAB关于需要2美元圆PBFT型BF协议的最佳弹性索赔。对于美元=1美元的特例,我们的协议只需要4美元的复制品,并严格改进PBFT,将弹性减少一回合(即使一个备份有误)。