Electoral spoilers are such agents that there exists a coalition of agents whose total gain when a putative spoiler is eliminated exceeds that spoiler's share in the election outcome. So far spoiler effects have been analyzed primarily in the context of single-winner electoral systems. We consider this problem in the context of multi-district party elections. We introduce a formal measure of a party's excess electoral impact, treating "spoilership" as a manner of degree. This approach allows us to compare multi-winner social choice rules according to their degree of spoiler susceptibility. We present experimental results, as well as analytical results for toy models, for seven classical rules ($k$-Borda, Chamberlin--Courant, Harmonic-Borda, Jefferson--D'Hondt, PAV, SNTV, and STV). Since the probabilistic models commonly used in computational social choice have been developed for non-party elections, we extend them to be able to generate multi-district party elections.
翻译：选举破坏者就是存在一个代理人联盟的代理人,当一个推定的破坏者被消灭时,其总收益超过破坏者在选举结果中的份额。迄今为止,破坏者效应主要在单一赢家选举制度的背景下分析。我们从多区政党选举的角度来考虑这一问题。我们引入了对一个政党的过度选举影响的正式衡量标准,将“石油”作为一种程度的处理。这种方法使我们能够根据破坏者易感程度来比较多赢的社会选择规则。我们提出了实验结果以及玩具模型的分析结果,包括七个经典规则的玩具模型(k$-Borda、Caplin-Courant、Harmonic-Borda、Jefferson-D'Hondt、PAV、SNTV和STV ) 。 由于计算社会选择中常用的概率模型已经为非政党选举开发出来,因此我们扩大了这些模型,以便能够产生多区政党选举。
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