Many researchers and policymakers have expressed excitement about algorithmic explanations enabling more fair and responsible decision-making. However, recent experimental studies have found that explanations do not always improve human use of algorithmic advice. In this study, we shed light on how people interpret and respond to counterfactual explanations (CFEs) -- explanations that show how a model's output would change with marginal changes to its input(s) -- in the context of pretrial risk assessment instruments (PRAIs). We ran think-aloud trials with eight sitting U.S. state court judges, providing them with recommendations from a PRAI that includes CFEs. We found that the CFEs did not alter the judges' decisions. At first, judges misinterpreted the counterfactuals as real -- rather than hypothetical -- changes to defendants. Once judges understood what the counterfactuals meant, they ignored them, stating their role is only to make decisions regarding the actual defendant in question. The judges also expressed a mix of reasons for ignoring or following the advice of the PRAI without CFEs. These results add to the literature detailing the unexpected ways in which people respond to algorithms and explanations. They also highlight new challenges associated with improving human-algorithm collaborations through explanations.
翻译:许多研究人员和决策者对算法解释表示兴奋,使决策更加公平和负责。然而,最近的实验研究发现,解释并不总是改善人类对算法咨询意见的使用。在本研究中,我们阐明了人们如何解释和回应反事实解释(CFES) -- -- 说明模型产出如何变化,其投入在审前风险评估工具(PRAIs)中略有变化。我们与8名美国现任州法院法官进行了思考式审判,向他们提供了包括CFES在内的PRAI建议。我们发现,CFES并没有改变法官的决定。首先,法官将反事实解释为对被告的真实(而不是假设)变化。一旦法官理解反事实的含义,他们就置之不理,指出他们的作用只是就所涉实际被告做出决定。法官们还提出了各种理由,说明为何无视或遵循没有CFES的PRAI建议。这些结果补充了文献,详细说明了人们对算法和解释做出意外反应的方式。他们还通过人类解释改进了新的挑战。