For object reallocation problems, if preferences are strict but otherwise unrestricted, the Top Trading Cycle rule (TTC) is the leading rule: It is the only rule satisfying efficiency, the endowment lower bound, and strategy-proofness; moreover, TTC coincides with the core. However, on the subdomain of single-peaked preferences, Bade (2019a) defines a new rule, the "crawler", which also satisfies the first three properties. Our first theorem states that the crawler and a naturally defined "dual" rule are actually the same. Next, for object allocation problems, we define a probabilistic version of the crawler by choosing an endowment profile at random according to a uniform distribution, and applying the original definition. Our second theorem states that this rule is the same as the "random priority rule" which, as proved by Knuth (1996) and Abdulkadiroglu and S\"onmez (1998), is equivalent to the "core from random endowments".
翻译:对于目标再分配问题,如果优惠是严格但以其他方式不受限制的,顶层交易周期规则(TTC)是主要规则:这是满足效率、捐赠受约束程度较低和战略防守性的唯一规则;此外,TTC与核心相吻合。然而,在单面溢价优惠的子领域,Bade (2019a) 定义了一条新规则, 即“ 伐木者 ”, 也满足前三个属性。 我们的第一个理论指出, 爬行者和自然定义的“ 双向” 规则实际上是一样的。 其次, 对于对象分配问题, 我们定义了爬行者的一个概率化版本, 随机地根据统一的分布选择捐赠情况, 并应用原始定义。 我们的第二个理论指出, 这一规则与“ 随机优先规则” 相同, 正如 Knuth(1996) 和 Abdulkadiroglu 和 S\ onmez (1998) 所证明的, 与“ 随机捐赠者” 等同。