A self-governed society must have rules by which group decisions are made, and these rules are often codified in a written constitution. One of the defining features of a constitution is its degree of entrenchment, or how hard it is to change it by amendment. If it is too easy to make amendments, then the constitution can change too frequently, leading to chaos. On the other hand, if it is too hard to make amendments, then this can also be destabilizing, as voters may begin to see the rules as less legitimate, or even seek to overturn the status quo in a revolt. As norms, priorities, and circumstances change over time and over generations, a constitution must be able to adapt. Our work considers a stylized model of constitutions that use reality-aware supermajority rules to make decisions. We propose principles for designing amendment procedures for changing decision rules in these constitutions and propose a novel procedure based on these principles.
翻译:自治社会必须拥有集体决策的规则,而这些规则往往被编纂成成成文宪法。宪法的决定性特征之一是宪法的巩固程度,或修改宪法的难度。如果修订过于容易,那么宪法就会经常改变,导致混乱。另一方面,如果修订过于困难,那么这也有可能破坏稳定,因为选民可能开始认为规则不那么合法,甚至试图推翻叛乱中的现状。随着规范、优先事项和情况随时间、代代代而变化,宪法必须能够适应。我们的工作认为,宪法模式过于僵化,使用认识到现实的绝对多数规则来作出决定。我们提出了为修改这些宪法中的决定规则而设计修正程序的原则,并提出了基于这些原则的新程序。