The integration of large language models (LLMs) into the planning module of Embodied Artificial Intelligence (Embodied AI) systems has greatly enhanced their ability to translate complex user instructions into executable policies. In this paper, we demystified how traditional LLM jailbreak attacks behave in the Embodied AI context. We conducted a comprehensive safety analysis of the LLM-based planning module of embodied AI systems against jailbreak attacks. Using the carefully crafted Harmful-RLbench, we accessed 20 open-source and proprietary LLMs under traditional jailbreak attacks, and highlighted two key challenges when adopting the prior jailbreak techniques to embodied AI contexts: (1) The harmful text output by LLMs does not necessarily induce harmful policies in Embodied AI context, and (2) even we can generate harmful policies, we have to guarantee they are executable in practice. To overcome those challenges, we propose Policy Executable (POEX) jailbreak attacks, where harmful instructions and optimized suffixes are injected into LLM-based planning modules, leading embodied AI to perform harmful actions in both simulated and physical environments. Our approach involves constraining adversarial suffixes to evade detection and fine-tuning a policy evaluater to improve the executability of harmful policies. We conducted extensive experiments on both a robotic arm embodied AI platform and simulators, to validate the attack and policy success rates on 136 harmful instructions from Harmful-RLbench. Our findings expose serious safety vulnerabilities in LLM-based planning modules, including the ability of POEX to be transferred across models. Finally, we propose mitigation strategies, such as safety-constrained prompts, pre- and post-planning checks, to address these vulnerabilities and ensure the safe deployment of embodied AI in real-world settings.
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