Recent works have demonstrated that deep learning models are vulnerable to backdoor poisoning attacks, where these attacks instill spurious correlations to external trigger patterns or objects (e.g., stickers, sunglasses, etc.). We find that such external trigger signals are unnecessary, as highly effective backdoors can be easily inserted using rotation-based image transformation. Our method constructs the poisoned dataset by rotating a limited amount of objects and labeling them incorrectly; once trained with it, the victim's model will make undesirable predictions during run-time inference. It exhibits a significantly high attack success rate while maintaining clean performance through comprehensive empirical studies on image classification and object detection tasks. Furthermore, we evaluate standard data augmentation techniques and four different backdoor defenses against our attack and find that none of them can serve as a consistent mitigation approach. Our attack can be easily deployed in the real world since it only requires rotating the object, as we show in both image classification and object detection applications. Overall, our work highlights a new, simple, physically realizable, and highly effective vector for backdoor attacks. Our video demo is available at https://youtu.be/6JIF8wnX34M.
翻译:最近的工作表明,深层次的学习模式很容易受到后门中毒袭击,这些袭击预示了与外部触发模式或物体(例如标签、太阳镜等)的虚假关联。我们发现,这些外部触发信号是不必要的,因为高效的后门可以很容易地使用旋转式图像转换插入。我们的方法通过旋转数量有限的物体并错误地贴上标签来构建有毒数据集;经过培训后,受害者模型将在运行期间作出不可取的预测。这些袭击在通过图像分类和物体探测任务的全面实验研究保持清洁性能的同时,表明袭击成功率非常高。此外,我们评估了标准的数据增强技术和四种不同的后门防御手段,发现没有一个可以作为一致的减缓方法。我们的攻击可以很容易地在现实世界部署,因为它只需要旋转物体,正如我们在图像分类和物体探测应用中所显示的那样。总体而言,我们的工作突出了一种新的、简单、实际可实现的和高效的后门攻击矢量。我们的视频演示可在 https://youtu.JIF8wXM.